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statute may have. This assumption is contrary to the rules of judicial construc-
tion saying it is not necessary to the validity of a statute that the legislature
declare on the face of the act the policy or purpose for which it was enacted.20
The statute should be held to have accomplished what the legislature had in
view, when the language will warrant an interpretation favorable to the apparent
object.30 Furthermore, a remedial statute should be construed so as to meet the
mischief it seeks to correct and advance the remedy. 31 In determining what was
the mischief, the courts may look to legislative debates and contemporaneous
outside events. 32 Therefore, the court may look at the findings of the Moreland
Commission and the recommendations of Governor Rockefeller in determining
the purpose of the statute. These two reports clearly show that the purpose of
the statute was to remedy an evil which resulted in price discrimination against
the New York consumer, a purpose somewhat inconsistent with promoting tem-
perance, but, nevertheless, a legislative purpose. This alone should be sufficient
to meet Chief Judge Desmond's argument, but there is further evidence avail-
able. The purpose of prohibiting price discrimination against the New York
consumer is explicitly stated in the introduction to the revised statute as it ap-
pears in the session laws, for it says that the statute is "an act to amend the
alcoholic beverage control law . . . [by] prohibiting price discrimination in sales
to wholesalers and retailers .... ,33 Therefore, one can conclude that the statute
in question had more than one purpose. Section 9, seeking to achieve lower
liquor prices for the benefit of the New York consumer, is entirely consistent
with one of the stated purposes of the statute. The means chosen, price regula-
tion, to achieve a stated purpose of the statute, the prohibition of price dis-
crimination in sales to wholesalers and retailers, thereby benefitting the New
York consumer, does not violate the due process clause of the United States or
New York Constitutions, for it is reasonably calculated to achieve that desired
end. CHARLES E. MILCH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INSPECTIONS AND THE WARRANT REQUIRE-
MENT-WARRANT REQUIRED IN ZONING INSPECTIONS WHERE PURPOSE Is To
GATHER EVIDENCE FOR A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Erwine Laverne was a furniture designer and interior decorator who carried
on his business in his home, which was located in a residential zone. The
local zoning ordinance prohibited the operation of any business within a
29. People v. West, 106 N.Y. 293, 12 N.E. 610 (1887).
30. Fonda, Johnstown and Gloversville R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 3 A.).2d 178, 159
N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 853, 166 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1957).
31. Commissioners of Excise v. Taylor, 21 N.Y. 173, 19 How. Pr. 289 (1860); Beal
v. Finch, 11 N.Y. 128, 9 How. Pr. 385 (1854).
32. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 207 Misc. 291, 138 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aft'd,
1 A.D.2d 3, 147 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st Dep't 1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956),
aff'd, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
33. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 531.
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residential zone and authorized building inspectors to enter a resident's home
at reasonable hours to search for violations of the regulations. Laverne was
convicted of violating the ordinance on the basis of evidence obtained by the
building inspector who entered his home without his consent. He was given a
six months suspended sentence in a trial conducted by the village police court,
and the conviction was affirmed by the county court. On appeal by permission
from the judgment for the people, held, reversed, three judges dissenting.
Three of the judges who voted for reversal relied on Mapp v. Ohio' in holding
that in the absence of a search warrant, evidence obtained for use in a criminal
proceeding by a public official during a search made without the resident's
consent is constitutionally inadmissible under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments.2 Chief Judge Desmond concurred to complete the majority, but
solely on the ground that the record showed no probable cause for the search.
The dissenting judges believed that the most effective tool for the enforcement
of regulatory statutes designed to protect health and welfare is periodic
inspection. Therefore, the requirement that a warrant be obtained if consent
were withheld would seriously hamper the enforcement of such zoning ordi-
nances. They also noted that under New York law an inspector is not em-
powered to obtain a warrant.3 People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d
441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).
The limitations on the right of aL government official to enter an individual's
private dwelling to search for evidence have developed in two distinct direc-
tions. In those cases involving police searches for the purpose of gathering
evidence to be used in criminal proceedings, the right to enter without consent
and without a warrant has become increasingly more restricted. Through the
use of the exclusionary rule, first adopted in Weeks v. United States,4 and ex-
tended in Elkins v. United States,5 and Mapp v. Ohio,6 the courts have pro-
hibited the introduction of illegally seized evidence in criminal actions, where
such evidence was obtained through a search and seizure found unconstitu-
tional under the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution. Generally, a search warrant is required when consent is with-
held.7 In the cases of inspections by public officials of 'private homes for the
purpose of gathering evidence for use in a civil action, either administrative or
judicial, with regard to violations of public welfare statutes, the law is not
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. An additional part of the holding, reasoned by analogy from People v. O'Neill,
11 N.Y.2d 148, 182 N.E.2d 95, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962) held that § 813-d of the N.Y. Code
of Crim. Proc. applied only to physical evidence. Failure to make a pre-trial motion for the
suppression of illegally seized evidence in the form of testimony did not constitute a
waiver of the right to so move during trial.
3. N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 791 (1953).
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). -
5. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. The exceptions are a search made incidental to and contemporaneous with a
valid arrest, Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and the search of a moving
vehicle, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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as clear." Although many cities have regulations authorizing officials to inspect
during reasonable hours,9 it seems that this legislation has been rarely chal-
lenged by those few individuals who object to such inspections. 10
Only three individuals have brought their claims of the unconstitutional-
ity of these long-accepted regulations as far as the Supreme Court.11 In 1949,
a resident of Washington, D.C. appealed from her conviction for interfering
with an attempted inspection by a health inspector, a misdemeanor under
local law.12 She had refused to admit an inspector whom she had found waiting
outside the door when she returned home. The inspector was answering a
complaint of a violation of the health regulations by a resident of the same
building. In a strongly-worded opinion, Judge Prettyman of the Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court conviction on constitutional grounds.1 3
He rejected the argument of the prosecution and the dissent, that the fourth
amendment's prohibition against searches without warrants applied only to
criminal cases. Judge Prettyman ruled that the fourth amendment ruled out
all searches of personal property without warrants regardless of whether the
search was utilized for a criminal prosecution or a civil remedy. He believed
that the fourth amendment protected a common-law right to privacy and
that a government official could not, therefore, invade a private home "... un-
less (1) a magistrate has authorized him to do so or (2) an immediate major
crisis in the performance of duty affords neither time nor opportunity to
apply to a magistrate."'.4 The Supreme Court upheld the reversal, but it
avoided the constitutional question and based its decision on the factual
ground that Mrs. Little's refusal to admit the inspector under the given cir-
cumstances did not constitute an "interference" within the meaning of the
statute.,5
In 1959, the leading case in this field arose out of the conviction of a
8. Inspections of business premises have long been upheld. Sister Felicitas v. Hart-
ridge, 148 Ga. 832, 98 S.E. 538 (1919) (reasonable exercise of the police power); Keiper v.
City of Louisville, 152 Ky. 691, 154 S.W. 18 (1913); Kelleher v. Minshull, 11 Wash. 2d
380, 119 P.2d 302 (1941) (inspection of a public place does not fall within the fourth
amendment); Safee v. City of Buffalo, 204 App. Div. 561, 198 N.Y. Supp. 646 (4th Dep't
1923).
9. Of 57 cities studied, 36 empowered their officers to enter and inspect for viola-
tions. Provisions of Housing Codes in Various Cities, Urban Renewal Bulletin No. 3
(1956).
10. The only evidence in support of the proposition are defendant's figures introduced
in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), showing that prosecutions under the health
code for refusing to admit an inspector averaged only one per year, Memorandum of
Appellee at Request of Court, No. 2. The fact that a similar code in New York has not been
challenged is some further evidence. N.Y. Mult. Resid. Law §§ 303(3), 304(1) (1952);
N.Y. Town Law § 138 (1965).
11. There are only two state cases directly on point. Camara v. Munic. Ct. of San
Francisco, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1965) ; Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).
12. Commissioner's Regulations Concerning the Use and Occupancy of Buildings and
Grounds, promulgated 1897, as amended 1922.
13. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
14. Id. at 17.
15. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), affirming on other grounds 178
F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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B'altimore resident for refusing to admit a building inspector. 16 The inspector
was searching for the source of rodent infestation on the basis of a complaint
from a home-owner on the same street. The presence of rats was obvious from
the condition of the grounds around the house. Aaron Frank was found guilty
of refusing to admit an inspector in violation of the Baltimore City Code'
and was fined twenty dollars. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority
of five, upheld the conviction.1 8 He found that two protections emerged from
the broad constitutional proscriptions of official invasion established by the
fourth amendment. The first is the right to be secure from instrusions into
personal privacy, the second is the right to self-protection. And it was the
right to self-protection, the right to be secure from searches for evidence to
be used in criminal prosecutions, that inspired the struggles against unreason-
able searches.' 9 This conclusion was drawn from a study of the early case
of Entick v. Carrington,20 and the history of the colonies at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. Furthermore, the right to privacy was not in-
volved here because of the nature of the search,2 1 and in addition, the statute
involved contained strong safeguards. There was a requirement of suspicion
on the part of the Commissioner of Health, inspections were only authorized
during the daytime, and entry was not authorized without consent? 2 Justice
Frankfurter also pointed to the necessity for health inspections in a modern
urban society and the long history of similar inspection statutes in Maryland.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the dissent, strongly disagreed with the histori-
cal interpretation and concluded that the fourth amendment was designed to
protect a right to privacy encompassing such inspections.23
It soon became obvious that the court did not base its decision on the
safeguards which the Baltimore statute involved or upon the reasonableness
of the inspection, given the factual background. In 1960, the Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court conviction of a Dayton, Ohio resident who had refused
to admit an inspector in violation of a city ordinance2 4 in a 4-4 memorandum
decision. 25 The defendant was convicted for refusing to allow inspectors into
his home who were not searching for a suspected nuisance or immediate health
hazard, as they had in Frank, but who were merely making a routine area-
by-area inspection. The statute involved here contained none of the safeguards
of the Baltimore statute involved in the Frank decision.26
16. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
17. Baltimore, 0., City Code Art. 12, § 120 (1950).
18. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
19. Id. at 365.
20. 19 How. St. Trials col. 1029 (Ct. of C.P. 1765).
21. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366 (1959).
22. Baltimore, 0., City Code Art. 12, § 120 (1950); Frank v. Maryland, supra note 21,
at 366-67.
23. Frank v. Maryland, supra note 21, at 374 (dissenting opinion).
24. Dayton, 0., Code of General Ordinances 18099, § 806-30(a) (1954).
25. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
26. Dayton, 0., Code of General Ordinances 18099, § 806-30(a) (1954); Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, supra note 25, at 268 (dissenting opinion).
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In the instant case, the New York Court of Appeals reversed Laverne's
conviction noting that the important question in regard to the zoning ordinance
was the
.. validity of that provision of the village ordinance which purports
by public authority to sanction entry into private premises by an
official without the consent of the occupant and, indeed, against his
resistance, for the purpose of obtaining evidence for a criminal prose-
cution 27
The Court stated that "the searches ... of defendant's home without warrants
for the purpose of criminal prosecutions were to that extent in violation of
his constitutional rights."128 The more controversial part of the decision stems
from the Court's pronouncement that
Prbbably an entry into private premises by a public officer without
a search warrant against the resistance of the occupant and in pursu-
ance of the authority of law for the purpose of eliminating a hazard
immediately dangerous to health and public safety is constitutionally
valid if the purpose be summary or other administrative correction
or as a foundation for civil judicial proceedings. (Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1959), rehearing denied, 360 U.S. 914; Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).2 9
The Court of Appeals, however, reserved decision on the question until "an
appropriate case may come here" in which the "validity of a search utilized
for civil action" is challenged.30 Chief Judge Desmond in his concurring opinion
reasoned that a search without a warrant, without consent and without
necessity could not be made without a showing of probable cause. It appears
that Judge Desmond would not require that probable cause be shown before
a magistrate, but only in the record. 3' The dissent ignored Mapp v. Ohio,
3 2
in effect denying its relevance to the "civil search" then before the Court,
and relied heavily on the necessity argument first used by Justice Frankfurter.
33
In light of the fact that the purpose for the inspection in the instant
case was to gather evidence for use in a criminal proceeding, the holding of
the Court that such inspections are in violation of the Constitution appears
correct under Mapp v. Ohio.34 But the Court's pronouncement, that a similar
ordinance involving an immediate health hazard and civil sanctions would
probably be valid, on the basis of the Frank and Eaton decisions, is not as
solidly established.
The first fact that must be noted is that no body of judicial opinion has
27. Instant case at 306-07, 200 N.E.2d at 442, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 453-54 (1964).
28. Instant case at 308, 200 N.E.2d at 443, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
29. Instant case at 307, 200 N.E.2d at 442, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
30. Instant case at 308, 200 N.E.2d at 443, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
31. Instant case at 310, 200 N.E.2d at 444, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (concurring opinion).
32. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. Instant case at 312, 200 N.E.2d 441, 445, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452, 458 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
34. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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developed on the question of civil searches with or without warrants. While
the absence of judicial sanction is not necessarily "persuasive authority that
it is unlawful, '35 its absence is not authority for the conclusion that it is
lawful. As the dissent said in Frank v. Maryland, the support found for the
majority opinion
concerning Maryland's long-standing health measures may be only a
history of acquiescence or a policy of enforcement which never tested
the procedure in a definitive and authoritive way.... We are pointed
to no body of judicial opinion which purports to authorize entries
into private dwellings without warrants in search of unsanitary con-
ditions.36
Although there is some support for Justice Frankfurter's contention that
Entick v. Carrington,3 7 the landmark case on the right to privacy, dealt only
with criminal cases and extended the right to privacy only to that degree,38
the weight of authority supports the belief that Entick v. Carrington went
beyond the question in the case to firmly establish a right to privacy within
one's home.30 But the history of the colonies and England prior to the War
of Independence is of greater importance to the question involved here. When
Pitt denounced the cider tax,40 and James Otis spoke out against the writs
of assistance, 41 and Patrick Henry opposed the adoption of the Constitution
without a Bill of Rights,42 they were primarily interested in protecting the
homes of ordinary citizens from indiscriminate and unreasonable governmental
invasions. The broad language used clearly indicates this. 43 And it should be
noted that the writs of assistance which were so vehemently protested against
were designed for use in civil searches by customs officials. 44 There is no rea-
son why a civil search or inspection without a warrant which can lead to
criminal penalties should be less objectionable than a civil search with a general
warrant which could lead to forfeitures.
The fourth amendment was designed to prevent uncontrolled invasions
into the privacy of one's home by requiring that an independent finding of
probable cause be made by a judicial officer, a neutral and detached magistrate,
rather than by the very person about to make the search.45 Those who argue
that the fourth amendment has no proper relationship to health inspections,
35. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
36. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 384 n.2 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
37. 19 How. St. Trials col. 1029 (Ct. of C.P. 1765).
38. Waters, Right of Entry in Administrative Officers, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 79 (1959).
39. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 212, 216; Comment, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 513, 524 (1959).
40. 15 Hansard, Parlimentary History of England 1307 (1763).
41. Quincy's Mass. Rep. 471-76 (1865).
42. 3 Elliot, Debates 448, 588 (1854).
43. Quincy's Mass. Rep. 471-76 (1865). James Otis said "... a man, who is quiet,
is as secure in his house, as a Prince in his Castle- . . . and if an Act of Parliament should
be made, in the very Words of this Petition (writ of assistance) it would be void."
44. See Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment, Johns
Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series 55, no. 2 (1937).
45. Giordenelio v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
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because their purpose is not to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions, 4
overlook some significant issues. They ignore the possibility that the inspector
himself may have other motives besides maintaining minimum housing condi-
tions for the protection of society. The requirement of a warrant issued by
a disinterested member of the judiciary would insure that health inspections
were not being utilized to harass suspected criminals, or as a method of look-
ing for evidence of a crime without the need to meet the probable cause test
for a search warrant.47 As Justice Douglas so delicately put it, "History shows
that all officers tend to be officious; and health inspectors, making out a case
for criminal prosecution of the citizen, are no exception." 48 And the argument
that the fourth amendment should not be applied to health inspections because
their purpose is not to gather evidence for use in a criminal proceeding is
itself without merit. For, assuming for the moment that the original inspec-
tion can be supported as not falling within the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments for this reason, a second inspection, for the purpose of ascertaining
whether an order to remove or abate a nuisance has been complied with, cannot
be said to fall within the same exception. If the order has not been obeyed,
the inspection becomes a search for evidence to be used in a criminal proceed-
ing. The imposition of a fine or imprisonment cannot be explained away by
calling it incidental to the true purpose of the inspection, or as a mere remedial,
and not punitive, measure.49 Evidence obtained by this second inspection
might well be classified as inadmissible in a criminal prosecution under the Court
of Appeals' ruling in the instant case.
Another basic argument used in support of broad inspection powers with-
out warrants under the health codes is the argument of necessity. Justice Frank-
furter, the dissent in the instant case, and others, ° have argued that broad
inspection powers are indispensable to the enforcement of health and housing
codes and that the requirement of a warrant would seriously hamper the
effectiveness of such codes designed for the public good. No one could rationally
deny the validity of the premise that health inspections are an absolute necessity
in today's urban society.5 ' The prevention and control of communicable
diseases, the enforcement of minimum standards of housing, the necessity
for adequate methods of waste disposal, and the control of rodent infestation
are all necessary and admirable aims of municipal government. But support of
the premise does not require the conclusion that the right to privacy, and the
protections inherent in a warrant, must end and bow to the demands of social
46. 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 265, 273 (1959).
47. See State v. Buxton, 238 Ind. 93, 148 N.E.2d 547 (1958) (fire inspectors searched
for evidence of arson without a warrant); State v. Pettiford, Daily Record, December 16,
1959 (Md. 1959) cited in Note, 20 Md. L. Rev. 345, 350, n.23 (police officers gained entry
to private home without search warrant masquarading as a health inspector).
48. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 382 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
49. Stahl & Kuhn, Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 11 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 256,
263 (1950).
50. Id. at 275.
51. Id. at 266-275.
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progress. The courts which have dealt with the problem of health inspections
have erred in failing to distinguish between the two necessities involved here.
52
The first is the necessity for the inspection itself. The second is the
necessity for a warrant in order to carry out the inspection where the home-
owner refuses to consent to the inspection. The two are not necessarily in
conflict. They would only be so if large numbers of people objected to health
inspections. But whatever evidence exists shows just the opposite to be true.
For conceding that the requirement of a warrant where consent to the inspec-
tion is withheld would take up some of the inspector's valuable time, it has
not been shown that the time loss would be significant. While empirical evi-
dence on a nationwide basis does not exist, 53 it would appear that most people
accept health inspections without protest. Perhaps it is a realization that such
inspections are for their own ultimate good, and a part of the price of urban
living. Perhaps it is a desire to avoid entanglement in the bureaucratic
machinery of municipal government.54 But whatever the reasons for general
acquiescence, there appears to be no good reason why a citizen should not
be permitted to stand upon a constitutional right and refuse to admit an
inspector without a warrant, if he so desires.
The conclusion that a warrant should be required when consent is withheld
is not without its own problems. The requirement that probable cause be
shown before a warrant will issue has appeared to some to be insurmountable
in the field of health inspections,55 where the evidence of a violation is often
found only upon inspection itself. Suggestions that probable cause be founded
upon the complaint of a neighbor, location of the house in a blighted area, or
upon conditions found outside the house have been assailed as unsatisfactory
because they do not meet the requirements of probable cause. Justice Douglas
has suggested that the test of probable cause can take into account the nature
of the search being sought. "This is not to sanction synthetic search warrants
but to recognize that the showing of probable cause in a health case may
have quite different requirements than the one required in graver situations. '56
The objection is probably valid, especially in cases where the complaint is
made by unnamed neighbors,57 or where the inspection is purely routine, and
based only on the fact that no inspection has been made for a considerable
time. The truth of the matter may well be that no inspection will be permitted
where no showing of probable cause can be made because indications of viola-
52. See Camara v. Munic. Ct. of San Francisco, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1965), as typical
of this type of reasoning.
53. See note 10 supra. The availability of statistical evidence may have to await the
publication of Professor Beaney's proposed work on the right to privacy, which he r.fers to
in the article cited at note 39 supra.
54. Note, 10 Hastings L.J. 430, 434 (1959).
55. 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 265, 274 (1959).
56. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
57. If the same standards were used for granting warrants in health cases as are
used in criminal cases, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) would b controlling.
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ions cannot be found outside the home. In light of the fact that few people
object, and that most inspections are made in blighted areas where probable
cause could be found,58 it is doubtful that this result will destroy the effective-
ness and efficiency of health and welfare inspection programs.5 9
The right to privacy has been described by Justice Brandeis as "the right
to be let alone- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."0 0 But the critical question is whether the right to privacy, en-
compassing within it the privilege to deny entry to any governmental official
without a warrant, is a right or "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'61 The Frank
and Eaton decisions held that it was not such a principle and therefore not
incorporated within the fourteenth amendment. However, recent decisions of
the Supreme Court incorporating sections of the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment, 62 combined with the Court's willingness "to re-examine past
decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the
preservation of basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its
Framers ...,"63 indicates that the Frank decision may not withstand another
constitutional challenge.
GEORGE WALLACH
INSURANCE LAW-NoN-EsCAPING FmE HELD To CONSTITUTE Hos-
TILE FIRE
When the automatic temperature control device of plaintiff's gas fired an-
nealing furnace inexplicably failed to operate, the furnace became "almost white
hot" so that furnace and forgings therein were totally ruined. Plaintiff, a manu-
facturer of hand tools, claimed recovery under a standard New York fire in-
surance policy which covered all direct loss by fire.' On submission of the con-
troversy on an agreed statement of facts, 2 held, for plaintiff. In view of modern
heating devices and equipment, when an uncontrolled fire produces excessive heat
causing damage, it is a hostile fire and within the coverage of the policy even
58. Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1115 (1956).
59. Supra note 58, at 1125. But see Guandolo, Housing Codes in Urban Renewal,
25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1956).
60. Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
61. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), quoting in part, Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
63. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
1. N.Y. Ins. Law § 168.
2. N.Y. CPLR R. 3222.
